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INtRODUCtION
Much of the commentary on Fiji’s 
coup of December 2006, particularly that 
sympathetic to Commodore Bainimarama’s 
intervention, pays little attention to, or 
grossly misrepresents, the nature of the 
government that he removed. Contrary to 
the military regime’s post-coup rhetoric 
about the ethnically divisive policies of the 
Qarase Government, the period from May 
to December had seen an experiment in 
executive power-sharing in which, for the 
first time, the provisions of s.99 of the 
1997 Constitution were fully and faithfully 
implemented, with Fiji’s two biggest political 
parties, each supported by a large majority 
of one of Fiji’s two major ethnic groups, 
cooperating in Cabinet. Its untimely end is 
now held by some commentators to be proof 
of the inherent unworkability of s.99. This 
paper seeks to test that proposition. 
thE CONStItUtION REvIEw 
COMMISSION: ENCOURAGING 
MUltI-EthNIC POlItICS
Fiji’s 1990 Constitution, which embodied 
the outcomes of Rabuka’s 1987 coups, 
contained a clause providing for a review 
seven years after its promulgation. This 
review was conducted by an independent 
Constitution Review Commission, chaired 
by former New Zealand Governor General 
Sir Paul Reeves, which undertook very wide 
consultations within Fiji and examined the 
constitutions of a number of other countries 
with multi-ethnic populations that might hold 
lessons for Fiji. 
The Commission concluded that all of 
Fiji’s communities had “a common interest 
in constitutional arrangements that bring 
them together, rather than pull them apart”, 
which had been the unintended effect of 
previous constitutions. Efforts to combine 
the Westminster system with communal 
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representation, a response to Fiji’s multi-
ethnic society, had failed to produce a political 
environment that encouraged political parties 
to seek support across ethnic community 
lines. The Commission recommended 
a package of measures to encourage the 
emergence of multi-ethnic governments. This 
included:
• maintaining the parliamentary form of 
government in which the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet members are chosen from 
Members of Parliament;
•	 recognising	the	role	of	political	parties	in	
forming governments that can command a 
majority in the House of Representatives;
•	 providing	 incentives	 for	 cooperation	
among ethnic communities in forming and 
supporting political parties;
•	 phasing	out	 communal	 representation	but	
providing assurances to all communities 
of continued adequate representation in 
Parliament; and
•	 providing	 assurances	 that	 the	 rights	
and interests of all communities would 
be protected under a multi-ethnic 
government.
A key recommendation proposed a 
significant change in electoral arrangements 
to promote cooperation across ethnic lines. 
The 1990 Constitution had done away 
with the national cross-voting seats of the 
independence Constitution and provided 
for the House to be composed solely of 
communal seats. The allocation of these 
seats among the communities was weighted 
disproportionately to Fijians and General 
Voters and against Indo-Fijians. In place of 
this, the Commission recommended that the 
House comprise a mixture of communal and 
“open” seats, the latter having no restriction 
on the ethnicity of electors or candidates. 
The balance between communal and open 
seats would be 25 to 45 in a 70 member 
House. As victory in communal seats alone 
would not ensure a majority in the House, 
the open seats would become the critical 
electoral battlegrounds. 
To give incentives to ethnic communities 
to take a multi-ethnic approach to the open 
seat contests, the Commission proposed that 
election to open seats be effected through 
fifteen heterogeneous constituencies, 
each returning three members. The ethnic 
composition of the three member tickets 
would be for parties to decide but there 
was a presumption that ethnically-mixed 
slates of candidates would fare better. Over 
time, as electors in all communities gained 
confidence that their needs and interests 
were being served through this system, 
the Commission envisaged the development 
of genuinely multi-ethnic parties and the 
progressive elimination of communal seats.
PARlIAMENtARy SCRUtINy AND 
ItS OUtCOME
These electoral recommendations proved 
to be too radical for the Joint Parliamentary 
Select Committee that considered the 
Commission’s report. The Select Committee 
reversed the ratio of communal to open seats 
and rejected the concept of multi-member open 
constituencies. It agreed with the principle of 
encouraging the emergence of genuinely 
multi-ethnic government but proposed that 
this be achieved through a mandatory power-
sharing arrangement, which emerged as s.99 
of the 1997 Constitution. The Commission, 
which received many submissions in favour of 
power-sharing, had examined specific power-
sharing arrangements in other countries, 
but concluded that voluntary agreements, 
not constitutional prescription, would best 
promote political cooperation among Fiji’s 
ethnic communities.
In departing thus from the carefully 
balanced package proposed by the 
Commission the Select Committee did not 
take sufficient account of the consequences 
of superimposing onto a Westminster system 
provisions governing the formation of Cabinet 
that limited a Prime Minister’s freedom of 
choice. S.99(5) of the 1997 Constitution 
required a Prime Minister, in establishing 
a Cabinet, to “invite all parties whose 
membership in the House of Representatives 
comprises at least 10 per cent of the total 
membership of the House to be represented 
in Cabinet in proportion to their numbers in the 
House”, but the Prime Minister was expected 
to command a majority. There was no clear 
formula for deciding Cabinet allocations 
among qualified parties; there were no rules 
for the conduct of Cabinet; there was no limit 
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on Cabinet membership; and the processes 
for selecting Ministers from qualified parties 
were vague, apart from a requirement for the 
Prime Minister to consult the leaders of those 
parties. These issues had to be resolved 
in the courts after legal challenges to the 
manner in which Prime Ministers Chaudhry 
and Qarase sought to apply s.99 after the 
1999 and 2001 elections. 
After Mahendra Chaudhry’s Fiji Labour 
Party (FLP) obtained an absolute majority 
(37 seats) in the 1999 election, it brought 
its coalition partners into government. Only 
one of these, the Fiji Association party, was 
entitled to participate according to s.99. 
The other party that qualified under s.99 
was the former governing party, Rabuka’s 
Soqosoqo Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), but 
the courts found that it placed conditions on 
its participation that amounted to a rejection of 
Chaudhry’s offer. In 2001, after his Soqosoqo 
Duavata Lewenivanua (SDL) party won most 
seats in the election, Laisenia Qarase formed 
a Cabinet with the Conservative Alliance 
Matanitu Vanua (CAMV) party, paying no 
attention to the power-sharing provisions of 
the Constitution. Challenged in the Court of 
Appeal and then the Supreme Court, Qarase 
was found in both to have acted in defiance 
of the law. After the decision of the Supreme 
Court in 2004, Qarase conformed to the 
letter, but not the spirit, of the law by offering 
the FLP token portfolios in an expanded 
Cabinet. The offer was rejected.
The behaviour of the two Prime Ministers 
in seeking to deny an effective power-
sharing role to the major rival party, and 
the subsequent protracted legal processes, 
undermined confidence in s.99 and in the 
concept of power-sharing.1
2006 – A POSt ElECtION 
SURPRISE
Against this background, Qarase’s decision 
after his party’s victory in the 2006 general 
election to appoint a multi-party Cabinet 
as prescribed in s.99 of the Constitution 
came as a considerable surprise, not least 
because of the ethno-nationalist reputation 
of the government he had led for the past 
five years. 
Qarase had previously made no secret of 
his dislike of s.99. He had publicly expressed 
his willingness to form a multi-ethnic Cabinet 
reflecting Fiji’s diversity, but preferred this to 
be done through a voluntary coalition of willing 
parties rather than through a constitutional 
requirement which almost inevitably threw 
together parties that were not natural 
partners. A voluntary coalition was not an 
option in 2006 because the general election 
had returned only three parties to the House, 
one of which had only two representatives 
and thus was not qualified under s.99 to 
participate in Cabinet. Moreover, because 
the series of court rulings since 2001 had 
clarified the way in which s.99 was to be 
interpreted, Qarase had to accept that a 
multi-party Cabinet was mandatory.
Circumstances after the 2006 election 
made it easier for him to contemplate 
compliance with the Constitution than was 
the case in 2001. His SDL party emerged 
from the 2006 election with 36 of the 71 
seats. He did not need to enter a coalition 
to command a majority. Unlike 2001 he had 
no need to make policy compromises to 
accommodate a partner in forming a multi-
party Cabinet. Qarase was secure in the 
support of ethnic Fijians, more than 80 per 
cent of whom had voted for SDL. He was no 
longer encumbered, as SDL had been in the 
previous parliamentary term, by the political 
necessity to placate an extremist coalition 
partner, the CAMV party; SDL had taken 
several CAMV members into its own ranks 
and those who remained outside failed to 
win election. Qarase was thus able to move 
towards the political centre.
He could have responded in a tokenistic 
way, as in 2004, but he did not. There had 
been signs during the election campaign 
that Qarase aspired to broaden his political 
base. He had tried hard, albeit with limited 
success, to increase support for SDL among 
Indo-Fijians. People who knew him well said 
he realised that a broader vision of Fiji’s 
future was needed to bolster confidence in 
his leadership. Having accepted this, he also 
saw that advantages would flow from early 
and decisive action to demonstrate a change 
in attitude.2
The uniformly positive public reactions to 
his 19 May announcement of an offer to the 
FLP leader suggested that he had read the 
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national mood accurately. Representatives 
of political parties, NGOs, and community 
organisations from both major communities 
welcomed the intention to implement s.99, 
and looked forward to a new spirit in politics 
that might mark a break from the divisions 
and controversies of the recent past. Even 
the Commander of the Republic of Fiji Military 
Forces (RFMF) expressed approval, although 
he had been a public critic of Qarase’s 
government during its previous term and had 
aligned himself during the election campaign 
with the coalition of opposition parties, the 
Fiji Labour Party (FLP), the National Alliance 
Party (NAP) and the United Peoples Party 
(UPP), going so far as to send RFMF civic 
action teams to conduct an anti-government 
“campaign of truth” in rural areas.3
FORMAtION OF thE 
GOvERNMENt
On 18 May, after being sworn in as 
Prime Minister, Qarase wrote to the FLP 
leader, offering portfolios to seven FLP 
representatives, and inviting Chaudhry to 
submit twelve names from among whom 
Qarase would choose Ministers. The 
portfolios offered to Labour were substantial: 
Agriculture; Commerce and Industry; Energy 
and Mineral Resources; Environment; 
Health; Local Government; and Labour and 
Industrial Relations. Qarase publicised the 
offer at a press conference the next day, 
and said he was contemplating a Cabinet 
comprising ten from SDL, seven from the 
FLP, two Independents and a small number 
of Senators. He wanted the Cabinet sworn in 
by 22 May. 
Qarase quickly secured the support of 
the two Independents, Jioji Konrote and 
Robin Irwin, which increased his support in 
the House to 38 but Chaudhry tried to set 
conditions for FLP participation. After the 
close election result he had attempted to 
form a governing coalition led by the FLP 
with support from Independents and the 
UPP, but failed. At the first post-election 
meeting of the FLP Parliamentary caucus, 
he pressed for a decision against acceptance 
of Qarase’s offer but caucus members 
overwhelmingly supported participation in 
Cabinet. Accepting the Prime Minister’s 
offer in principle, Chaudhry was reported as 
saying that ground rules for the operation 
of multi-party government would have to be 
agreed first, and that there would have to be 
prior agreement on a code of conduct for the 
leadership, on the size of the civil service, 
and on the “intent and spirit” of power-
sharing. He also claimed that the FLP was 
entitled to eight, rather than seven Cabinet 
posts. He ruled out accepting a Cabinet 
appointment for himself.4
Qarase conceded the additional 
Cabinet seat, acknowledging that his initial 
calculation understated the FLP entitlement, 
and subsequently offered the FLP a ninth 
Cabinet place. He declined to accept any 
preconditions, noting that this was not a 
voluntary coalition that required a prior 
agreement on fundamental policies. In 
adopting this stance he had a 2003 Supreme 
Court judgement on his side. Chaudhry was 
placed in a difficult position. The widespread 
public approval of Qarase’s initiative meant 
that rejection by the FLP would be politically 
damaging to the party.  The Parliamentary 
caucus meeting had shown a strong faction 
within the FLP to be responsive to the public 
mood and keen to participate in the Cabinet, 
implicitly challenging Chaudhry’s leadership 
and FLP unity.
Chaudhry grudgingly submitted his list 
of nominees for Cabinet – and they were 
his nominees rather than the product of 
discussions within the FLP leadership. He 
complained that the portfolios offered to the 
FLP were those that SDL had “messed up” 
during the previous parliamentary term. He 
criticised the Prime Minister’s decision to 
appoint to Cabinet individuals nominated 
to serve in the Senate, on the grounds that 
the Senate had not yet met. He claimed 
that three of the nominated Senators were 
SDL supporters and, according to court 
rulings, should be counted among the Prime 
Minister’s share of Cabinet appointments. 
Simultaneously, FLP President Jokapeci 
Koroi complained of election rigging and 
wrote to the Election Commission alleging 
irregularities in the conduct of the May 2006 
polls. After Qarase assigned three of the FLP 
nominees to portfolios different from what 
Chaudhry wanted for them, the FLP leader 
accused the Prime Minister of bad faith and 
convened an emergency caucus meeting, 
saying the FLP would have to reconsider its 
participation. Qarase insisted, correctly, that 
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it was his prerogative, as Prime Minister, to 
appoint Ministers and to allocate portfolios.
The FLP was still considering its position 
on 23 May when the SDL and Independent 
Ministers were sworn in by the President. The 
absence of FLP Ministers from the ceremony 
dampened the sense of occasion but shortly 
afterwards, still outnumbered within his party, 
Chaudhry confirmed that the FLP would 
join the government “because Fiji’s people 
expected it”. The nine FLP Ministers took 
their oaths of office on 24 May.5
Qarase’s acceptance of nine rather than 
seven FLP Ministers led him to increase the 
size of the Cabinet to twenty-four in order 
to respect the proportionality of the parties, 
maintain an SDL majority of two, and reflect 
ethnic and geographical balances. As part of 
this adjustment he created twelve positions 
of State Minister outside Cabinet, making 
the total Ministry thirty-six. Editorial comment 
was highly critical of the Cabinet’s size.
That Chaudhry was reluctant to accept 
FLP participation in Cabinet was confirmed 
by his subsequent attempt to have himself 
appointed Leader of the Opposition, the 
post he had held in the previous Parliament. 
While there were legitimate concerns about 
sustaining an effective Opposition in a House 
in which virtually all members would be part 
of the government, allowing Chaudhry to hold 
this post when his party was represented in 
Cabinet was not a solution that had any 
logic or much appeal. It was, moreover, 
inconsistent with the Korolevu Declaration, 
a 1999 agreement between party leaders to 
which Chaudhry had been a signatory and 
which laid down “principles, conventions 
and practices…in the implementation of the 
provisions of the new Constitution…as it 
relates to the establishment and functioning 
of a multi-party Cabinet”. Section 3(b) of 
the Declaration stated that “any party which 
participates in a Cabinet position is deemed 
not to be in the Opposition”. Mick Beddoes, 
leader of the United Peoples Party whose 
two members had not joined the government, 
was appointed Leader of the Opposition 
but, in accordance with a Court ruling after 
the 1999 election, accepted that Chaudhry 
should select the nominees for appointment 
as Senators that s.64 of the Constitution 
reserved to the Leader of the Opposition.6
POlItICAl MANAGEMENt IN thE 
MUltI-PARty CAbINEt
The Cabinet met for the first time on 25 
May. The only public comment after the 
meeting about ways of managing controversial 
issues indicated that these would be dealt 
with in Cabinet sub-committees in which 
both SDL and the FLP would be represented. 
Qarase amplified this point two days later in 
a speech to the Fiji Law Society explaining 
his approach to the multi-party Cabinet. 
He noted his former scepticism about the 
concept and acknowledged the public desire 
for a different approach. He said that other 
attempts to bridge Fiji’s racial divide had 
not been successful, and committed himself 
to making this one work. He emphasised 
that consensus decision-making would be 
the over-riding objective. He expressed 
confidence that internal differences would 
be infrequent and manageable because he 
saw a high degree of convergence between 
the election manifestos of the parties in 
government.7 
In his speech opening Parliament 
on 6 June President Iloilovatu urged all 
members of both chambers to do their best 
to make the multi-party Cabinet work but had 
nothing to say about political management 
processes that might achieve this. A sign of 
the challenges ahead came two weeks later 
when an FLP Minister, Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi, 
told the House that the government should 
withdraw all affirmative action bills, enact a 
code of conduct, and consult the FLP on all 
controversial legislation. Vayeshnoi’s speech 
was directed at Qarase’s intention, flagged in 
his first post-election press conference and 
confirmed in President Iloilovatu’s address, 
to introduce as a matter of priority bills on 
qoliqoli (customary fishing areas), national 
reconciliation, and establishment of an 
indigenous land claims tribunal, all measures 
perceived by a significant body of citizens 
to be holdovers from the ethno-nationalist 
agenda of the previous government.
Because Vayeshnoi was known to be close 
to Chaudhry, and because his comments 
echoed the conditions Chaudhry had sought 
to impose when the FLP was invited to 
join the government, this was seen as a 
challenge to the operations of the multi-party 
government. Other FLP Ministers publicly 
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disagreed with the implicit premise that the 
FLP manifesto had to have primacy for FLP 
Ministers. Chaudhry, defending Vayeshnoi’s 
comments as an exercise of the democratic 
right of freedom of speech, said the FLP 
National Council would consider ground rules 
for the multi-party Cabinet.8
This episode apart, there was almost 
no public comment on the importance of 
having clear and agreed ground rules for 
the new government or on the principles 
that should govern their formulation. Popular 
interest in the subject was negligible. 
None of the political party leaders saw 
fit to encourage public discussion of the 
options, either for educational purposes or 
to build support for their preferred approach, 
although Qarase, Chaudhry and Krishna Datt 
in their contributions to the House debate 
on the President’s address foreshadowed 
the positions they would subsequently 
advocate.  Out of the public eye all three put 
forward detailed proposals which reflected 
significantly different perspectives on power-
sharing. These proposals throw light on the 
political dynamics which helped to undermine 
the multi-party Cabinet. 
ChAUDhRy’S vIEw: PARty IS 
PARAMOUNt
Chaudhry presented a paper to the FLP 
National Council meeting on 24 June. It 
began by noting that a number of issues 
arising since the formation of the multi-party 
Cabinet made it imperative to draw up “firm 
guidelines and ground rules”, and went on 
to say:
“Central to the whole issue is the question 
of loyalty and obligation to the Party. It all 
boils down to a single question: Do FLP 
parliamentarians who are now members 
of the Qarase Cabinet owe their primary 
allegiance to the Party or is their allegiance 
now solely to the SDL Cabinet?”
After citing the Party Constitution, 
specifically Article 7 on Discipline, Chaudhry’s 
paper answered this question categorically:
“The interest of the Party must remain 
paramount. No member whether an MP or a 
Cabinet Minister is above the Party”.
Chaudhry then asked: “Are Labour 
members of the Cabinet bound by Party 
principles and policies?” His answer, citing 
Article 4 of the Party Constitution, was 
categorical:
“we must be guided by party policies and 
principles in conducting ourselves as MPs 
and Cabinet Ministers. The FLP Manifesto 
thus becomes the supreme policy document 
for the Labour Party…Labour’s key policies 
are clearly stated in the party’s 2006 Election 
Manifesto, and these must govern our 
conduct and regulate our actions.”
Chaudhry acknowledged that this would 
create a dilemma for FLP members of the 
Cabinet if conflicts arose between SDL and 
FLP policies, and asked: “What happens to 
the concept of collective Cabinet responsibility 
in such a situation?” His answer was:
 
“it is quite in order for a Labour member of 
Cabinet, and backbenchers, in the context 
of a multi-party Cabinet to express opinions 
and adhere to policies that may be in conflict 
with that of the ruling party.”  
In support of this proposition the paper 
cited the experience of Chaudhry’s People’s 
Coalition Government in which:
“members of other parties in Coalition with us, 
and in the multi-party Cabinet, backbenchers 
in particular, were free to express their views 
on issues and legislation without restriction. 
And this happened frequently. There was 
absolutely no gagging.” 
More to the point, the paper cited the July 
2003 Supreme Court judgement, quoting 
extensively from paragraphs 102-3,110-112 
and 129 to underline the argument that:
“the Labour Party is entitled, indeed required, 
to go into Cabinet with its own policies and 
agenda. And it has a right to demand that its 
policies be given cognition and fruition – 
albeit, this process may require ‘discussion, 
negotiation and compromise’.”
After some exhortations against being 
dragged into “business as usual in the SDL 
style”, reminders that “Labour’s raison d’etre 
for joining Cabinet was to provide a new 
direction in the governance of our nation”, 
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and a re-statement of key Labour policies, 
the paper asserted that:
“It must not be multi-party Cabinet at any 
cost!...The concept of collective Cabinet 
responsibility is fine as far as it goes...but 
Labour’s stand must prevail on key national 
issues such as: ALTA; the enactment of a 
Code of Conduct legislation and measures 
to deal with corrupt practices…;amendments 
to the Constitution; racial discrimination; 
amnesty provisions of the PRTU Bill; and 
other controversial legislation such as the 
proposed Qoliqoli Bill and legislation on 
the Land Claims Tribunal. On any of these 
key issues all FLP Members of Parliament, 
including our Ministers, must be bound to 
vote along Party lines.”
The paper concluded with a proposal that 
the National Council approve a “minimum 
common programme of action to be 
presented to the government with a definite 
timeline for implementation”. This would 
include legislation on a Code of Conduct, an 
anti-corruption commission, and freedom of 
information, along with the removal of racial 
discrimination from government policies and 
affirmative action programmes. 
“Yes, the nation wants the arrangement to 
work. But it wants Labour to go in there and 
make a difference to the governance of the 
nation – not to itself become part of a corrupt 
and self-serving apparatus”.9
Despite the reservations of their leader, 
and despite Chaudhry’s domination of the 
FLP National Council, the mood at the 24 
June meeting was strongly in favour of 
the multi-party Cabinet. Having seen and 
disagreed with Chaudhry’s paper, FLP 
founding member Krisha Datt pulled together 
and circulated some notes arguing the case 
for FLP participation in accordance with the 
national Constitution. He and Chaudhry put 
their respective cases to the meeting but 
there was no discussion of them. Chaudhry 
said that the purpose of his paper was to 
initiate some further reflection within the 
FLP. Evidently, he did not consider the time 
ripe for debate or decision. Neither did he 
take the opportunities provided by a range 
of subsequent Party meetings to air the 
differences between himself and Datt or to 
establish an agreed FLP position.10
Differences within the FLP leadership 
soon became public. The issue was not 
FLP participation in the government but the 
nomination of FLP representatives to the 
Senate. Five senior party members, including 
Ministers Datt and Bune, challenged the list 
Chaudhry wanted Beddoes, as Leader of 
the Opposition, to forward to the President. 
They claimed that Chaudhry had broken a 
pre-election agreement to nominate to the 
Senate a candidate who had stood aside 
in a safe Lower House seat. They asked 
Beddoes not to send the list to the President 
and called an emergency meeting of the FLP 
Management Board, disregarding objections 
by the Party President. This controversy 
rumbled on into July, with media reports 
that disciplinary action would be initiated 
against the five and that the FLP’s Nasinu 
Branch would suspend Datt, their own MP, 
for orchestrating a campaign to discredit 
Chaudhry.11
QARASE’S vIEw: thE CAbINEt 
MANUAl MODIFIED 
The Prime Minister had given little 
public indication of his views beyond the 
emphasis in his address to the Law Society 
on consensus decision-making and the use 
of sub-committees to bridge differences 
within Cabinet, but on 4 July he sent 
Chaudhry a detailed paper entitled “Multi-
party Government in Fiji: Operational Ground 
Rules”.12
The paper was in seven sections. 
The Introduction explained the purpose 
of the paper: “to agree on the formation 
of ground rules which can facilitate the 
successful operation of this novel concept”. 
The second, Background to the SDL/FLP 
multi-party Cabinet, outlined the principles 
and processes on which the Cabinet had 
been formed, referring as appropriate to the 
relevant clauses of the Constitution. This 
section touched upon policy formulation by 
noting that:
 
“…the Prime Minister informed all Ministers 
that the SDL manifesto would provide the 
base document of the Government’s Strategic 
Development Plan…[H]e also made it clear 
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that where there are major differences in 
the SDL Manifesto and the FLP manifesto, 
there would be full discussions on a case by 
case basis, and the Prime Minister will chair 
a Cabinet sub-committee to develop agreed 
common positions.” (2.1 vi)
The third section, Formation of future 
multi-party Cabinets, began by differentiating 
the multi-party Cabinet from a coalition 
government, highlighting the point, recognised 
in s.99 of the Constitution, that: 
“…the Prime Minister and his party do 
not need the support of the entitled party 
(or parties) in the House to maintain 
their leadership in Government and in 
Parliament.”
That said,
“Fiji’s need for a multi-party Cabinet and 
Government is strongly reinforced by 
political reality. This reality is that under 
current circumstances this is the only way 
available under the Constitution to bring 
about a Cabinet and Government that is fully 
representative of our multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural society...” (3.0)
The remainder of the third section 
re-stated the Prime Minister’s authority 
and obligations under s.99 and s.103 of 
the Constitution, re-affirmed that the SDL 
manifesto was the base policy document, 
and repeated the assurances of consultation 
through a Cabinet sub-committee where 
policy differences arose.
The fourth section, Operation of Cabinet, 
laid down and elaborated a set of principles 
governing behaviour of Ministers: decision-
making by consensus; wide consultation by 
Ministers on their policy recommendations to 
facilitate consensus and unanimity in Cabinet; 
processes for addressing disagreements; 
collective responsibility of Ministers; Cabinet 
solidarity in public and in the House; and 
procedures to be followed if Ministers could 
not support a Cabinet decision (including 
replacement of a Minister from the entitled 
party who resigned or was dismissed). The 
fact that most of these guidelines and ground 
rules were already prescribed in the Cabinet 
Manual was explicitly noted in paragraph 
4.12 of this section.  
In addressing the principle of collective 
responsibility and Cabinet confidentiality, this 
section exposed very clearly the difference 
from Chaudhry’s approach:
“The commitment by all political parties 
(and Independents) represented in the multi-
party Cabinet to this principle of collective 
solidarity and responsibility is also important 
in underscoring their acceptance to be in 
Cabinet without any preconditions.” (4.4)
 On the confidentiality of Cabinet papers 
and proceedings, the paper said:
“…all Ministers in Cabinet are bound to 
observe this confidentiality and to safeguard 
the security of Cabinet documents. They 
are not permitted to disclose how decisions 
were arrived at, or differences expressed 
in Cabinet, and the identity of Ministers 
concerned. Not even to members of their 
own Party outside Cabinet.” (4.8) 
The fifth section, Operation of the House 
of Representatives and the Senate, dealt 
with the “direct consequential impact on 
how both the House of Representatives 
and the Senate conduct their proceedings”. 
It emphasised that all parties represented 
in the multi-party Cabinet became part of 
the government. Government back-benchers 
would no longer be confined to the Prime 
Minister’s party.
“Those members from an entitled party who 
are not appointed as Ministers will also be 
regarded as backbenchers of the Government 
side. They will be bound by the collective 
responsibility of all Government Ministers 
to support Government policies and Bills, as 
decided by the multi-party Cabinet” (5.3. i) 
The same applied to Senators appointed 
on the nomination of the Leader of the 
Opposition who would have to regard 
themselves, along with the Prime Minister’s 
appointees, “as generally being bound by 
the multi-party government’s position in the 
House of Representatives” (5.3.ii).
Acknowledging that “Good governance 
requires a strong Opposition in Parliament to 
keep Government accountable” and that the 
official Opposition was confined to a small 
minority party, the paper addressed “new 
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ways of strengthening scrutiny of Government 
legislation and other measures”. The core 
proposal was to make full use of Sector 
Committees, Standing Committees and Ad 
Hoc Committees, involving backbenchers 
from both parties in government as well as the 
official Opposition, to encourage bi-partisan 
consultation and constructive dialogue. The 
Government undertook to use committees 
for detailed scrutiny of all major legislative 
initiatives, with Ministers required to respond 
to committee invitations to give briefings and 
presentations. (5.4, 5,5)
In the House, all parties represented in the 
Cabinet were bound to support Government 
policy and legislative initiatives but would 
be free to contribute to discussion of issues 
and policies presented in the House by the 
Government and would be encouraged to 
make constructive recommendations and 
suggestions, “particularly where they differ 
from the position of Cabinet and Government”. 
Regular caucus consultations would be 
essential to ensure “unanimity and solidarity 
on Government business” and to hear and 
deal with dissent from backbenchers. The 
Prime Minister would convene consultation 
meetings with the leader of the entitled 
party and the Leader of the Opposition 
to “fully inform his political colleagues on 
Government’s thinking behind particular 
policies or legislative proposals”. Ministers 
would be expected to “make regular use of 
ministerial statements in the House and in the 
Senate to amplify and explain Government’s 
stand on particular issues and situations” 
(5.6 i-vi)
The final two sections addressed the 
Civil Service and Media Relations, the latter 
encouraging Ministers actively to explain 
policies within their portfolios to the media 
and to respond quickly to media enquiries, 
preferably in writing.13
DAtt’S vIEw: SUStAINING A 
GOOD FAIth RElAtIONShIP IN A 
MUltI-PARty CAbINEt
Krishna Datt turned his notes from the 24 
June meeting into a paper entitled “Fiji Multi-
party Ground Rules” which he submitted 
for discussion at the 19 August National 
Council meeting. He described it in the 
introductory paragraph as a critical analysis 
of the proposals made by the Prime Minister 
and Chaudhry which recommended “a 
progressive way forward to sustain the good 
faith relationship in the multi-party Cabinet”. 
(1.1)
Datt’s paper began with a succinct 
summary of Qarase’s proposals. It then 
addressed Chaudhry’s, saying that the FLP 
leader:
“…is contending the view suggested by 
the PM, maintaining that he needs to be 
consulted and that FLP members in Cabinet 
are still under the FLP control and expected 
not to compromise its policy stand on 
contentious issues…He still advocates a 
confrontational and adversarial approach 
to conflict resolution rather than through 
good faith that is based on respect, mutual 
trust, consensus building and fair dealings. 
He expects everyone in the FLP to operate 
in confrontational mode, rather than 
empowering his trust on the FLP members 
in Cabinet to advocate for the FLP positions 
through the current mechanisms.”  (3.1, 3.2) 
Datt went on to state that the FLP 
Management Board and Parliamentary 
Caucus had approved of participation in 
the multi-party Cabinet but action had 
been delayed by Chaudhry’s insistence on 
formalising the decision at a National Council 
meeting. In Datt’s words, this amounted to 
“being hijacked by bad faith on technicalities”. 
(4.1)
Turning to Chaudhry’s belief that FLP 
members of Cabinet owed their primary 
allegiance to the Party and not the Cabinet, 
Datt challenged the constitutional argument 
his leader had advanced. The FLP 
Constitution, he noted, pre-dated the 1997 
Constitution and assumed that a Westminster 
system operated in Fiji. The FLP Constitution, 
including Article 7 on which Chaudhry had 
relied, needed “urgent changes to include 
and facilitate good faith multi-party Cabinet”. 
(4.2 – 4.4)
On Chaudhry’s insistence that all FLP 
members of Cabinet were bound by Party 
policies and principles, Datt again observed 
that Chaudhry’s recourse to Article 4 of the 
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Party Constitution was out-dated. He went 
on to say:
“The stand by Hon Chaudhry that Party loyalty 
is superior to national loyalty in Government 
smacks of political fundamentalism that 
fuels confrontation without compromise 
for the national good. This stand does 
nothing to reform the adversarial culture 
of conflict resolution in favour of mutual 
dialogue minimising the need for judicial 
intervention.”  (4.9)
Datt next addressed the handling of 
conflicting policies within the Cabinet. He 
pointed first to the 2003 Supreme Court 
judgement, which was “very clear on the 
conventions of collective responsibility and 
Cabinet confidentiality”. He accepted that 
Cabinet sub-committees and Parliamentary 
committees could be, and were already 
being, used effectively to resolve differences 
across party lines. In this situation:
“…the main challenge for the FLP is to 
lobby its stand through the art of engaged 
dialogue, discussion, negotiation, persuasion, 
compromise and developing mutual trust…
This means that the FLP is going into Cabinet 
with its own policies and national agenda 
just like any party. [Its] approach in settling 
the differences will have to be in good 
faith rather than the current adversarial and 
confrontational approach that destroys the 
multi-party arrangement…In the context of 
the multi-party Cabinet, the Fiji Constitution 
is the supreme law of the land and not the 
FLP Constitution or the SDL Constitution 
or the UPP Constitution or any Party’s 
constitution. Whilst all parties will have their 
own Constitutions, Manifestos and policies, 
common sense should tell us that national 
governance supersedes party governance in 
a multi-party Government.” (4.10 - 4.13)
Datt challenged the “misconceived” idea 
that the FLP risked losing its identity in a multi-
party arrangement; this “has the element of 
mistrust on the capabilities and talents of 
FLP members in Cabinet [and] is bad faith 
on the part of FLP leadership”. Fiji’s people 
had overwhelmingly supported the multi-
party arrangement and FLP members should 
be “change agents from inside the political 
system and not a bystander with expertise 
only in opposing and going to courts and 
international bodies for sanction...” (4.16 – 
4.17). This comment reflected a longer term 
dissatisfaction with FLP litigation against 
Qarase’s government since 2001 and with 
simultaneous FLP appeals to supranational 
organisations to exert pressure on that 
government. 
As for Chaudhry’s Key Policies and 
Minimum Common Programme, Datt said 
most of them were high priorities for the 
government. The areas of difference were 
small, albeit significant and challenging. The 
multi-party Cabinet system was capable of 
resolving them, including issues such as 
ALTA and land tenure, the qoliqooli and 
reconciliation legislation, and affirmative 
action programmes. (5.1 – 5.2)
Datt’s paper concluded with a set of 
recommendations for an FLP approach to 
the multi-party Cabinet closer to Qarase’s 
conception than to Chaudhry’s. The final 
recommendation called for Fiji to learn from 
New Zealand’s experience of multi-party 
government.14
SEEkING AGREEMENt
According to an SDL source, much of the 
discussion on ground rules was conducted 
in telephone conversations between Qarase 
and Chaudhry. They met on 7 July but did 
not reach agreement. As the differences 
within the FLP were still unresolved and were 
attracting a good deal of media attention, this 
was not surprising. In publicly acknowledging 
the existence of a split Chaudhry said it would 
be dealt with at a forthcoming FLP National 
Council meeting. For him, the challenge 
to his leadership was the priority. In the 
period before the National Council meeting, 
which was scheduled for 19 August, the 
FLP President announced that disciplinary 
charges against the five dissenters would be 
heard there. After protracted manoeuvring 
between the two sides, including recourse to 
the courts, the five walked out of the National 
Council. No discussion of Datt’s paper or of 
the ground rules issue more generally took 
place during the meeting.15
On 30 August the Prime Minister and 
Chaudhry met again to discuss ground rules. 
They subsequently exchanged letters from 
which the main elements of their discussions 
can be reconstructed. On the ground rules, 
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the letters addressed mainly process issues. 
Chaudhry advised the Prime Minister that he 
had circulated Qarase’s paper widely within 
the FLP and that it would be considered at 
the annual Delegates Conference on 23 
September. He also advised that the FLP 
National Council wanted the matter finalised 
between the leaders of parties represented 
in the multi-party Cabinet. In reply, the Prime 
Minister noted the information about the 
Delegates Conference and disagreed with 
Chaudhry’s proposal to limit decision-making 
on the ground rules to SDL and FLP, saying 
that the Leader of the Opposition should 
also participate. Qarase also observed that 
his request for a copy of Chaudhry’s paper 
on ground rules had not been answered. 
Chaudhry wrote back re-stating his objection 
to the inclusion of Beddoes, and sent his 
draft on ground rules, commenting that it was 
not yet in final form because it would also be 
considered by the Delegates Conference. 
The letters also show that Chaudhry 
had succeeded in widening the discussions 
to include sugar industry restructuring, 
amendments to the Constitution, the 
economy, agricultural land use, and proposed 
legislation on qoliqoli and an indigenous land 
claims tribunal. While not explicitly linked 
to FLP agreement on ground rules, their 
inclusion in the correspondence nevertheless 
provided a hook for later bargaining.16
On 5 October the Prime Minister and 
Chaudhry met again. Afterwards they issued 
a joint statement announcing that they had 
held consultations with their respective 
party caucuses and had agreed to continue 
discussions on ground rules in a joint 
committee of SDL and FLP representatives. 
They agreed that the objective should 
be agreement “with urgency to facilitate 
legislative proceedings in the House of 
Representatives”. The statement mentioned 
discussions having taken place on land 
issues and changes to the Constitution. The 
joint committee seems never to have been 
established.17
FUNCtIONING OF thE CAbINEt
Those who participated in the multi-party 
Cabinet during its short life considered that it 
worked effectively. Most of the FLP Ministers 
observed the spirit of Datt’s paper, taking 
the position that, while ground rules were 
important, nothing should be done to prevent 
the functioning of the Cabinet under existing 
principles and conventions so long as these 
applied equally to all Ministers. Datt himself 
believed that, because demographic trends 
were turning sharply against Indo-Fijians, 
making a success of the multi-party Cabinet 
was essential to guarantee them a continuing 
role in governing their country. So FLP 
Ministers took their Ministerial obligations 
very seriously and, in most cases, accepted 
that they were accountable to the Prime 
Minister. Qarase commented warmly 
and often, both publicly and privately, on 
the capabilities and contributions of FLP 
Ministers. Since the more senior of them 
brought long experience of politics and public 
service to their portfolios, it was no surprise 
that they performed as well as, or better than, 
their counterparts from Qarase’s own party. 
For his part, the Prime Minister respected 
the conception of the ground rules presented 
in his paper by ensuring that FLP Ministers 
were represented in Cabinet sub-committees 
on policy, legislation and budget, and using 
these and other sub-committees to facilitate 
consultation and consensus. He allowed 
them freely to express their views, including 
on the controversial draft legislation.18
The sub-committee on social services, 
with FLP participation, considered affirmative 
action policies, a key plank of the previous 
government, and agreed to review them, 
taking into account a report by a Kenyan 
constitutional lawyer, Yash Ghai, who had 
longstanding familiarity with Fiji. The draft 
legislation on qoliqoli and on a land claims 
tribunal were discussed in the full Cabinet, 
where very frank exchanges took place 
without reaching a decision point requiring 
FLP Ministers to support them. These two 
Bills were introduced into the House on 8 
August and referred for committee scrutiny 
with a reporting deadline in the November/
December session of Parliament. In both 
cases there was a degree of confidence in the 
ability of a Parliamentary Sector Committee 
to deal appropriately with the drafts.19 
This confidence in Parliamentary 
processes perhaps arose from the fate of the 
controversial Promotion of Reconciliation, 
Tolerance and Unity (PRTU) Bill in the previous 
Parliament. Since the proposed revival of 
this legislation was among the justifications 
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for the 2006 coup, a brief recapitulation of 
its history is appropriate. When introduced 
into the House in May 2005, the PRTU Bill 
was widely regarded as a device to expedite 
the pardoning of people convicted of crimes 
during the Speight coup of 2000 and the 
early release of those among them who 
had been imprisoned. This interpretation 
was reinforced by the presence in Cabinet 
of members of the ethno-nationalist CAMV 
Party, and by government actions, such as 
early release of the convicted former Vice 
President, which seemed to demonstrate that 
the government’s sympathies lay with the 
coup perpetrators rather than its victims. The 
RFMF was strongly opposed because it had 
put down the coup, at considerable cost to 
internal unity and to its relations with sections 
of the public. Rather than seek reconciliation, 
the RFMF Commander wanted to see more 
thorough and more expeditious investigations 
into those who had encouraged and financed 
the coup.  
During 2005 the controversy over the 
PRTU Bill provoked public activism on a 
scale rarely seen in Fiji, in the face of which 
the Government gradually retreated from 
the original concept. A mortal blow was 
dealt to the Bill by the report of the Joint 
Parliamentary Sector Committee on Justice, 
Law and Order to which the draft legislation 
was referred. Even though this committee 
was chaired by a CAMV representative and 
boycotted by the FLP, its report declared the 
Bill to be thoroughly flawed in conception 
and recommended that it be withdrawn. 
Considerable effort went into revising the 
Bill before Parliament was prorogued for the 
2006 general election, but no revised text 
was ever made public. In statements after 
his 2006 election victory Qarase undertook to 
bring a revised PRTU Bill back to Parliament, 
provoking the RFMF Commander to 
increasingly hostile public criticism of the 
government and its leader, but Ministers had 
not seen a text by mid-November when the 
presentation of the Budget raised in stark 
form the difficulties of multi-party government 
without agreed rules.20
thE bUDGEt CRISIS
FLP Ministers were involved in the 
preparation of the Budget but, following 
the Westminster convention, were not told 
of revenue-generating measures until the 
Finance Minister briefed Cabinet on the 
morning the Budget was to be presented. 
Among the new measures was a VAT increase 
of 2.5 percent. Chaudhry, seizing upon 
this, denounced the Budget as “anti-poor” 
and directed FLP members of Parliament, 
Ministers included, to vote against it. He 
insisted that a vote against the Budget would 
not be a vote against the multi-party Cabinet. 
Two FLP Ministers, Vayeshnoi and Ragho 
Nand, said they would follow the Party 
directive.21
Krishna Datt made it clear that he 
disapproved of the VAT measure, knew it 
would be badly received in communities 
important to him, and would resign if there 
was to be any further increase in future 
but said he believed that he could soften 
the impact more effectively from inside the 
Cabinet than from outside. He contrasted 
this stance with Chaudhry’s taking “the 
easy path” of opposition from without; if the 
FLP was truly pro-poor, Datt said, it should 
engage whole-heartedly in the multi-party 
Cabinet. He revealed that Chaudhry had 
told the FLP caucus of the Prime Minister’s 
recent offer to appoint him Deputy Prime 
Minister which Chaudhry had declined 
because the Budget made it hard for him 
to accept. Datt said he found this response 
incomprehensible, given the scope the post 
offered to influence policy, and wondered 
aloud about Chaudhry’s motives. Datt also 
challenged Chaudhry’s directive to FLP 
members, vigorously defended the principle 
of Cabinet solidarity, and accused the FLP 
leader of trying to impose conditions on 
FLP participation in Cabinet despite having 
unconditionally accepted Qarase’s offer of 
Cabinet places.22
The Prime Minister gave no public 
indication of a willingness to bend the Cabinet 
rules as he saw them, because he had a 
majority without the FLP votes. But he was 
keen to preserve the multi-party Cabinet and 
met again with Chaudhry on 20 November 
to try and resolve the impasse over ground 
rules. He also wrote to Chaudhry offering 
FLP Ministers the option of abstaining on the 
Budget vote. In private he expected at least 
five FLP Ministers to abstain if allowed to do 
so. Qarase was also willing to see Chaudhry 
nominate replacements for any FLP Ministers 
who resigned or were dismissed over the 
Budget vote. Chaudhry’s answer came in 
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his contribution to the Budget debate, an 
extended attack on the manner in which 
multi-party government had been managed: 
he said it had made no difference to the 
quality of governance; had not introduced an 
new era of partnership; had not seen proper 
consultation between the partners; and had 
lacked “fundamental values of trust, honesty 
and integrity”.23
In his speech on 22 November the Prime 
Minister described the vote on the Budget 
as a vote on the multi-party Cabinet and its 
future because an appropriations bill was a 
confidence matter. He recalled the principle 
of collective responsibility. He acknowledged 
that FLP Ministers were in a difficult situation 
because of their party’s directive. Voting 
against the Budget would mean resignation 
or dismissal; voting for the Budget would 
risk expulsion from their party. In the 
circumstances, he said, he would accept an 
abstention by the FLP Ministers.
“An abstention will enable the Labour 
Ministers to safeguard their integrity and 
preserve their loyalty to Fiji’s supreme law, 
the Constitution…[M]y decision on this 
is a reflection of my commitment to the 
Multi-Party Cabinet and its continuation. 
It is an indication of the value I attach to 
the contribution to the Government of the 
Labour Minister. It is also a statement of my 
loyalty to those who are loyal to me.”  
He appealed to Chaudhry to reconsider 
the FLP directive on voting “in the national 
interest and in the interest of multi-ethnic 
cooperation represented by the Multi-Party 
Cabinet”. 
In a vote later that day on the second 
reading of the Budget Bill, twenty-six 
members voted against, including four FLP 
Ministers and all FLP backbenchers. Five 
other FLP Ministers were absent from the 
House. The two UPP members and the two 
Independents were among the forty who 
supported the Budget. Chaudhry threatened 
disciplinary action against the absentee FLP 
Ministers. At the same time he argued against 
resignation of the four FLP Ministers who 
had opposed the Budget on the basis that 
the Prime Minister could have been more 
accommodating in the absence of agreement 
on ground rules.24
The Prime Minister deferred action 
against the four, hoping that he might trade 
off this inaction for similar treatment by 
Chaudhry of the five absentee Ministers. 
This hope evaporated on 2 December 
when Datt and Bune were expelled from 
the FLP. They remained in Parliament and 
in Cabinet pending appeals but by then 
the Government’s conflict with the RFMF 
was coming to a head and the multi-party 
Cabinet, already seriously weakened, had 
only days left. 
whAt wENt wRONG?
The multi-party government was brought 
down by the intervention of the armed forces. 
Commodore Bainimarama’s mid-2006 
plaudits for the new arrangement proved 
to be short-lived. Within four months of 
the formation of the Cabinet he and his 
spokesmen were publicly at loggerheads 
with the Prime Minister over policy issues, 
especially the proposed legislation on qoliqoli, 
national reconciliation, and the indigenous 
land claims tribunal. Their exchanges 
confirmed that the two sides interpreted very 
differently the Constitution’s provisions on 
the role of the armed forces in Fiji’s polity. 
The government considered that the 1997 
Constitution subordinated the RFMF to the 
civil authority; the Commander insisted that 
its special status in the 1990 Constitution had 
been carried forward, making the RFMF an 
equal party and the guarantor of the political, 
economic and social order. The Commander 
did not respond to government offers to seek 
a binding opinion from the Supreme Court.
In October the RFMF began to call on 
the government to resign, saying the RFMF 
had lost confidence in it. The government 
responded by convening meetings of the 
National Security Council to which the 
Commander was not invited on the grounds 
that he was the principal source of insecurity. 
At the end of October, while Bainimarama 
was out of the country visiting Fijian troops 
in the Middle East, the government sought 
to remove him from command of the RFMF, 
nominating another officer as Commander on 
an acting basis. The appointee declined to 
take the post and the senior RFMF leadership 
pressed for implementation to be deferred 
until Bainimarama returned. Civil/military 
relations deteriorated quickly thereafter.
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An implicit theme of the RFMF critique 
of the government was that the second 
Qarase administration was no different from 
the first. This view – that Qarase led a 
divisive government bent on pursuit of racist 
policies – has been propagated assiduously 
by the post-coup regime and has found a 
surprisingly receptive audience inside Fiji and 
beyond. Its ready acceptance is explained by 
antipathies and resentments arising from 
the undoubtedly divisive policies of the SDL/
CAMV government. In the brief period before 
the RFMF turned against the multi-party 
government Qarase was unable to convince 
Fiji’s citizens, especially those in the Indo-
Fijian community, that his change of heart was 
genuine. His attempts to rally public support 
as the RFMF ratcheted up the pressure 
elicited only feeble responses, even from an 
organisation like the Citizens’ Constitutional 
Forum, which had been established for the 
express purpose of explaining and defending 
the 1997 Constitution.
By giving a high priority to the controversial 
Bills, Qarase provided leverage for both 
Chaudhry and Bainimarama against the 
government. Tactically, he might have 
achieved more by holding them back until 
the multi-party Cabinet was well established, 
with achievements in other fields to its credit. 
But he did not. Despite Chaudhry’s objection 
on procedural grounds to their introduction, 
and his suggestion that they be deferred 
until the September sitting, the indigenous 
land claims tribunal and qoliqoli Bills were 
sent to the House as the eleventh and 
twelfth pieces of draft legislation submitted 
for consideration.25
The explanation lies partly in political 
factors and partly in personality. Qarase, a 
commoner from the eastern islands, depended 
on the big provinces of Viti Levu for his core 
support and was bound to take account of 
the interests and concerns of their chiefs and 
peoples. For many of them customary fishing 
and historical land grievances were important 
issues. Qarase may have over-estimated the 
influence of extremists but, as a nationalist 
himself, he was personally sympathetic to this 
agenda and saw his government delivering 
long desired (and, in the qoliqoli case, long 
promised) objectives of his core supporters. 
Opposition to these measures made him 
more determined, not least because he had 
given his Cabinet colleagues the opportunity 
to comment on them. He was not disposed 
to see that having the numbers in the House 
to pass the Bills without the votes of the FLP 
was only one of the considerations to be 
weighed in a power-sharing political system. 
Nor did he understand that Chaudhry, who 
was sceptical of Qarase’s conversion and 
commitment to the multi-party Cabinet, saw 
giving priority to these Bills as an attempt to 
engineer its collapse in a way that would see 
the blame attributed to the FLP.26
Chaudhry’s decision not to join the Cabinet 
cast a shadow over it from the outset. As Vice 
President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi commented 
at the time, this placed Chaudhry in a 
strategic position to destroy the multi-party 
government.27 Chaudhry’s unwillingness to 
take a Ministerial portfolio, his attempt to 
reclaim the post of Leader of the Opposition, 
his elevation of the FLP Constitution above 
the national Constitution, and his treatment 
of FLP dissidents all indicated a reluctance 
to see success achieved in this first serious 
attempt to implement the power-sharing 
provisions of the 1997 Constitution. He must 
bear a large share of the responsibility for its 
failure.
The inability to agree on ground rules 
before the Cabinet was operational, or at 
least early in its life, inhibited the building 
of trust in the multi-party experiment, both 
within and beyond the Cabinet. Speaking 
about three weeks before the coup, Leader 
of the Opposition Mick Beddoes described 
this as a failure of leadership:
“We have failed to establish acceptable 
rules of engagement to enable the multi-
party Cabinet to develop and strengthen, to 
promote power-sharing and greater national 
unity among all our people, and this inaction 
will put at risk the very thing we want to 
succeed.”28
Despite the thought that went into 
Qarase’s paper on the ground rules, there 
was no sense of urgency about the efforts 
to secure agreement on implementing them 
or some negotiated variant. Without that 
agreed platform the Prime Minister could not 
meet the political challenge posed by RFMF 
insubordination with strong demonstrations 
of Cabinet unity in defence of the principle 
that the civil authority is supreme. Nor could 
he counter effectively Chaudhry’s corrosive 
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manoeuvring against Cabinet solidarity and 
collective responsibility. Qarase was slow to 
appreciate these dangers, perhaps because 
things appeared to be working satisfactorily 
for some time, and then was unable to find 
effective counter-measures. This left him 
hostage to Chaudhry’s willingness to engage 
in serious negotiation in circumstances 
disadvantageous to the Prime Minister. 
During the Budget crisis he found himself 
having to offer compromises to save the 
Cabinet that Chaudhry had no intention of 
accepting.
In retrospect, the Prime Minister took 
too much of the load on himself. He carried 
virtually all of the public explanations and 
defence of the government’s actions and 
intentions. Few other Ministers or members 
of Parliament were involved in the task 
of persuading Fiji’s citizens that the multi-
party Cabinet marked a new direction in 
the country’s politics. Although the Prime 
Minister on occasion spoke eloquently about 
the multi-party government, he did not put in 
place a positive communications strategy to 
drive the message home effectively. Neither 
was there a considered strategy to counter 
the anti-government campaign mounted 
by the RFMF. Out of the public eye the 
Minister of Home Affairs, to whom the RFMF 
Commander was formally subordinate, 
engaged in extensive correspondence with 
the Commander, robustly contesting RFMF 
demands for policy changes and its right to 
make such demands. But he had little to say 
in public. The absence of other defenders of 
the government from within its ranks allowed 
the media to depict a dispute that raised 
serious constitutional issues as a soap opera 
about personality conflict: Bainimarama 
versus Qarase.
Personal antipathy between the two 
ran deep. Qarase displayed patience and 
forbearance far beyond what Bainimarama’s 
behaviour warranted but only rarely held the 
initiative. The Commodore had an unerring 
instinct for the Prime Minister’s weaknesses 
and an ability to command the media 
spotlight, allied to contempt for inconvenient 
facts or for consistency of argument. Since 
the coup he has presented himself as the 
advocate of “genuine democracy” for Fiji but 
throughout his campaign against Qarase he 
showed little respect for, or understanding of, 
the principles of democratic government and 
was hostile towards essential elements of 
working democracies, such as the contest of 
ideas, negotiation, and compromise. Whether 
or not Bainimarama acted in concert with 
Chaudhry, as some allege and Chaudhry 
has denied, their interests and objectives 
coincided. Between them, they destroyed the 
multi-party government.
wAS S. 99 INhERENtly 
UNwORkAblE?
The multi-party government’s life was so 
short that a definitive answer to this question 
is not possible. External factors, notably the 
pressure from the RFMF, were instrumental 
in its collapse. But the robustness of the 
power-sharing model was not really tested. 
Although the multi-party Cabinet was 
considered, especially by participants, to 
have worked well, that judgement must be 
qualified by the observation that Cabinet 
avoided most of the sterner tests by leaving 
it to Parliament to deal with controversial 
issues, such as the qoliqoli legislation. This 
approach was in keeping with the Prime 
Minister’s paper on the ground rules, the 
only one that addressed the consequences 
for the conduct of business in the House 
of Representatives and the Senate arising 
from the formation of a multi-party Cabinet. 
(Datt’s paper acknowledged this but did not 
elaborate the point as Qarase’s did.)
Analysis of comments by politicians during 
debates in the House reveals few signs 
of understanding that Parliament should 
play a different role under a multi-party 
power-sharing arrangement. Although many 
speakers saw the need for changed attitudes 
and behaviours, few of them mentioned 
adaptation of parliamentary processes or 
re-balancing of the powers of executive and 
legislature. By far the most sophisticated 
commentary on the implications for 
Parliament came from SDL’s Mere Samisoni. 
She saw clearly that it would fall to standing 
committees to “clarify issues, ask the hard 
questions, and complete tasks in good faith 
and cooperation…as a kind of second stage 
bipartisan legislative review”. She highlighted 
some uncertainties and ambiguities, not least 
where the role of the Opposition would 
reside, which she considered to show that:
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gone into the operational level of political 
and constitutional guidance for governing 
Fiji…This is all ivory tower stuff and it is 
now left to Parliament to find the substance 
necessary to make it all work”.29
Fiji’s delegates to the 28th Australia 
and Pacific Regional Conference of 
Commonwealth Parliamentarians, held in 
Wellington in August, presented a short 
paper on “Parliamentary Practice and the 
Multi-Party Government System in Fiji”. 
It did little more than identify a need to 
develop and better resource parliamentary 
committees and to ensure the maintenance 
of strong accountability mechanisms, and 
said candidly:
“For the moment there are no definite 
answers as to how these issues are going to 
be resolved.”30
In their report to the House in September 
the delegates drew attention to the increased 
role and importance of committees in New 
Zealand’s Parliament following the adoption 
of the Mixed Member Proportional electoral 
system, which tends to produce multi-party 
coalition governments, and observed that this 
held many lessons for Fiji. An offer to study 
New Zealand’s experience had been made 
by the New Zealand government in June but, 
despite considerable discussion about the 
timing of a study visit and the nature of other 
possible assistance, no formal response 
was received from Qarase, Chaudhry or 
Beddoes.31
In fewer than fifty sitting days during 
the life of the government, the House of 
Representatives had limited opportunities 
to re-cast its procedures to play the larger 
role envisaged in the Qarase ground rules 
and Samisoni’s analysis. Of eighteen Bills 
introduced, twelve had been passed by the 
House before the coup, and six were still 
under scrutiny in House or Joint Committees. 
Six of those passed were appropriations 
or money bills, and were not referred to 
committees. Most of the others were not 
contentious; committee scrutiny produced 
helpful clarifications and drafting amendments 
but did not generate much partisan heat.32
In the two cases where Bills were clearly 
controversial the evidence is ambiguous. 
The Indigenous Claims Tribunal Bill and the 
Qoliqoli Bill were referred on 9 August to the 
Joint Sector Standing Committee (JSSC) on 
Natural Resources and Economic Services 
for report back to the November-December 
session of the House. On 27 November the 
JSSC chairman presented an oral interim 
report on consideration of the two Bills, 
advising that the task was not complete and 
asking for an extension of time until February 
2007 because of the huge public interest and 
the constraints on the committee’s times for 
hearings. His remarks went beyond the strictly 
procedural purpose to include observations 
about the poor understanding of the issues 
displayed in submissions from people on both 
sides of the debate. In relation to the Qoliqoli 
Bill specifically, he offered an interpretation 
of public opinion, claiming that there was 
“general support for the purpose and intent” 
but “concerns about legal, economic and 
social aspects of implementation and policy”. 
Chaudhry immediately objected that FLP 
members of the JSSC had not discussed 
this report, a claim backed up by an FLP 
committee member, Felix Anthony. SDL’s 
Samisoni countered that the committee had 
discussed an extension of time. Chaudhry 
then objected to the inclusion of matters of 
substance in the report, leading the Speaker 
to invite committee members to sort out their 
differences. Two days later a revised oral 
report, stripped of comments on substance, 
was brought back to the House, which agreed 
to the extension.33
This example raises questions about the 
ability of parliamentary committees faced 
with controversial legislation to rise to the 
challenge but the specific circumstances 
are not conducive to firm judgements. 
The interim report by the JSSC chair was 
delivered only four days after the adoption 
of the Budget. Emotions were still running 
high because of the FLP directive and its 
consequences. The future of FLP Ministers 
was still unresolved, and optimism about the 
multi-party experiment severely dented. The 
Budget vote had dealt a body blow to hopes 
for more accommodative politics under a 
multi-party system. 
That said, agreement to extend the JSSC’s 
deadline was not an indicator of agreement 
on the substance of the Bills. FLP opposition 
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to them was strong from the outset. The FLP 
objectors to the oral report did not comment 
on the progress, if any, made in the JSSC. 
Committee records are not available. A well-
placed SDL source claims that the JSSC was 
satisfied with government explanations on 
the indigenous claims tribunal draft but still 
had major problems with the qoliqoli Bill. This 
was the focus of public opposition to the two 
Bills. The divide was sharp, with most Fijians 
on one side and the tourist industry, many 
Indo-Fijian organisations, and the Police 
Commissioner on the other. But there was 
nothing like the broad-based 2005 campaign 
against the PRTU Bill to influence the JSSC 
deliberations on the qoliqoli Bill. 
CONClUSIONS
Because a mandatory power-sharing 
requirement was introduced into the 1997 
Constitution without regard to its impact 
on other aspects of the carefully balanced 
package presented by the Constitution 
Review Commission, numerous uncertainties 
and ambiguities had to be clarified through 
the courts. The judgements dealt mainly with 
issues relating to the formation of Cabinet. 
As a result, numerical entitlements were 
established quite smoothly in 2006, and 
the controversies after the 1999 and 2001 
elections were not repeated. 
Once the Cabinet was formed, neither 
the Constitution nor court decisions provided 
any guidance to political actors on making 
multi-party government work effectively. 
The architects of s.99 had overlooked the 
impact of power-sharing on institutions other 
than Cabinet and on the wider political 
process. The crisis, when it came, was 
a parliamentary event, a confidence vote, 
and not an issue within Cabinet, although 
it created an unenviable dilemma for FLP 
Ministers, as their speeches in the Budget 
debate testify.34
Whether this crisis would have ended 
differently had agreed ground rules been 
operational is a matter for conjecture. 
Effective power-sharing requires confidence 
and trust between the cooperating parties. 
A mandatory constitutional provision cannot 
guarantee attitudinal changes by political 
actors. Agreed ground rules might have 
provided an essential framework within 
which to build the necessary confidence and 
trust but this would have taken more time 
than Qarase’s multi-party government was 
allowed.
AUthOR NOtES
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diplomat for more than 30 years.  He has 
served in New Zealand posts in Thailand; 
at the United Nations in New York; in 
China; in Indonesia, where he was 
Ambassador from 1997 until 2001; and 
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(accredited also to Nauru and Tuvalu) 
from 2004 until 2007. In Wellington he 
has worked in a number of divisions in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
and was for six years (1988-94) Director 
of the External Assessments Bureau 
in the Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. Between October 2001 
and November 2004 he was Deputy 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
responsible for Political and Security 
Affairs. He again served in Deputy 
Secretary posts after returning from Fiji, 
initially with responsibility for Australia, 
the Middle East and Africa, the Pacific 
and Public Affairs, and subsequently 
for South Asia and Latin America. The 
opinions expressed in this paper are his 
own.
ENDNOtES 
This summary of the recommendations of 1. 
the Constitution Review Commission and 
the Joint Parliamentary Select Committee 
draws upon the Commission’s report, 
The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future, 
Fiji Parliamentary Paper No 34 of 1996, 
and the Report of the Joint Parliamentary 
Select Committee on the Report of the 
Fiji Constitution Review Commission, 
Fiji Parliamentary Paper No 17 of 1997. 
I have also drawn on Lal (1998) and on 
Fraenkel (2006).
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This section draws on my observations 2. 
as New Zealand High Commissioner 
from December 2004 until June 2007 and 
on recent correspondence with Ministers 
and officials who served under Qarase 
whose identities I have agreed to protect. 
One of the few who anticipated Qarase’s 
initiative was the Vice President, Ratu 
Joni Madraiwiwi.  I was among the 
audience at USP’s annual Rev. Paula 
Niukula Lecture in March 2006 when 
Ratu Joni said he would not be surprised 
if a re-elected Qarase adopted a different 
stance because he understood that being 
Prime Minister of the Fijians was not 
enough.  See also Qarase, L (2007). 
Fiji Government Press Release No 146, 3. 
19 May, 2006 for Qarase’s announcement. 
For RFMF support see PACNews, 25 
May, 2006; The Fiji Times, 28 July 2006, 
and Mataivalu News, July/August 2006.
The Fiji Times4. , 19 May 2006; personal 
communication (anonymous) on the FLP 
caucus and on Chaudhry’s attempts to 
form a government.
The5.  Fiji Times, 20-24 May, 2006; 
Willoughby (2007); personal commun-
ication (anonymous). 
Korolevu Declaration by Parliamentary 6. 
Political Leaders in the Fiji Islands, 26 
January 1999, subsequently published as 
a Parliamentary Paper. One SDL source 
told me that Chaudhry’s formal proposals 
for ground rules were based on the 
Korolevu Declaration by which the Prime 
Minister did not consider himself bound 
because SDL, not having been founded 
in 1999, was not a signatory; personal 
communication (anonymous). 
Prime Minister’s Speech to the Fiji Law 7. 
Society Conference, 27 May, 2006.
Parliament of Fiji, House of 8. 
Representatives, Daily Hansard, 8 June 
(Chaudhry, Datt), 13 June (Vayeshnoi) and 
16 June (Qarase), 2006. (All subsequent 
Daily Hansard references are to House 
of Representatives meetings.) Most 
speakers in the debate on the President’s 
Address referred to the establishment of 
the multi-party Cabinet, usually (but not 
invariably) in optimistic terms. A handful 
of members apart from the three already 
named, offered more detailed analyses 
eg M. Samisoni (15 June) and Q. Bale 
(16 June) 
‘Discussion Paper on the Multi-Party 9. 
Cabinet’, M.P Chaudhry for FLP National 
Council Meeting, 24 June, 2006 (copy in 
author’s possession). Although its contents 
reflected the position Chaudhry took in 
negotiations with Qarase on ground rules, 
this was an FLP internal document, not 
an inter-party negotiating text. The ALTA 
cited in the penultimate quotation from 
the paper was the Agricultural Landlord 
and Tenant Act, a 1976 law governing the 
leasing of Fijian land. Expiry of leases 
under ALTA made adoption of revised 
legislation a major and controversial 
political issue. The PRTU Bill, mentioned 
in the same quotation, was the Promotion 
of Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill, 
introduced into Parliament by the SDL/
CAMV government in 2005, provoking 
unprecedented public controversy. This 
incident is summarised in the section of 
this paper entitled “Functioning of the 
Cabinet”.
Personal communication (anonymous)10. 
“Labour leaders at crisis point”, 11. The Fiji 
Times, 28 June, 2006; Maika Bolataki, 
‘Multi-party Cabinet Supports PM’, 
Fiji Sun, 6 July, 2006. One sign of the 
emotions generated by the split in the 
FLP was an incident in Nasinu, Krishna 
Datt’s electorate, where he was burned 
in effigy. 
According to SDL sources, this paper 12. 
was the product of an SDL caucus 
committee chaired by Attorney General 
Qoriniasi Bale. Personal communications 
(anonymous).  
‘Multi-Party Government in Fiji: 13. 
Operational Ground Rules’, Laisenia 
Qarase, Prime Minister, 29 June 2006 
(copy in author’s possession).
‘Discussion Paper: Fiji Multiparty Ground 14. 
Rules’, Hon Krishna Datt, 19 August, 
2006 (copy in author’s possession).
Personal communication (anonymous) on 15. 
the reliance on telephone conversations. 
The same source said Chaudhry put very 
little in writing and there were no written 
records of points of agreement between 
the two leaders. For the internal problems 
of the FLP, The Fiji Times, 28 June and 11 
July, 2006; Fijilive, 6 July, 2006; Fijivillage, 
28 June, 14 July and 21 August, 2006; and 
personal communication (anonymous). 
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In one of Chaudhry’s few public 
acknowledgements of Datt’s critique he 
said that Datt’s call for changes to the 
FLP Constitution “plainly stink of self-
interest”.
Chaudhry to Prime Minister, 11 September, 16. 
2006; Prime Minister to Chaudhry, 14 
September, 2006; Chaudhry to Prime 
Minister, 15 September, 2006 (copies 
in author’s possession). Beddoes, who 
took the Korolevu Declaration as the 
basis of the ground rules, was aware that 
Chaudhry wanted to exclude him from the 
discussions and any decisions flowing 
from them. 
“Prime Minister and Labour Leader 17. 
Make Further Progress”, Joint Statement 
signed by Hon. Laisenia Qarase and Hon. 
Mahendra Chaudhry, 5 October, 2006. 
Personal communication (anonymous) 
on non-establishment of the joint 
committee.
This section draws on my conversations 18. 
at the time, as New Zealand High 
Commissioner, with the Prime Minister 
and other Ministers, as well as on more 
recent correspondence with former 
Ministers and public servants familiar 
with the workings of the government. Two 
of my sources told me that FLP Minister 
Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi disregarded Cabinet 
confidentiality by briefing Chaudhry. A third 
source told me that Qarase cautioned 
Vayeshnoi about respecting Cabinet rules; 
personal communications (anonymous). 
Krishna Datt made the comments about 
the implications of demography at an 
EU-sponsored seminar assessing lessons 
of the 2006 elections which I attended. 
Other Cabinet sub-committees dealt with 
land; equal opportunities and human 
rights; constitutional change and review; 
and public enterprises and public sector 
reform – see Fiji Sun, 20 July, 2006. 
Daily Hansard19. , 9 August, 2006; personal 
communications (anonymous). The late 
Gyani Nand, Minister of Agriculture and 
FLP member, told me in August 2006 that 
Ministers had successfully negotiated the 
qoliqoli and land claims tribunal bills into 
a form suitable for introduction into the 
House. He commented that this showed 
that the multi-party concept worked.
On the matter of confidence in 20. 
Parliamentary processes to deal with 
controversial issues, see Qarase’s speech 
on 22 November during the Budget 
debate. He defended the controversial 
Bills by placing considerable weight on 
scrutiny by Sector Committees to deal 
with concerns expressed about them 
by interest groups and members of the 
public. The 2005 controversy over the 
three Bills has been covered extensively 
in publicly available articles. I have drawn 
on several of these, notably Mosmi 
Bhim, ‘The Impact of the Promotion of 
Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 
on the 2006 Election’ in Fraenkel and 
Firth, From Election to Coup in Fiji, and 
on my own recollections as a Suva-
based observer in the New Zealand High 
Commission.
SDL’s P. Ralulu told the House that three 21. 
FLP Ministers participated in the Budget 
sub-committee of Cabinet which met 
regularly between May and October; 
see Daily Hansard, 20 November, 2006. 
Vayeshnoi announced his intentions 
to vote against the VAT increase in 
his Budget debate speech; see Daily 
Hansard, 14 November, 2006. 
Daily Hansard22. , 14 November, 2006. Datt’s 
revelation that Chaudhry and Qarase had 
discussed the latter’s joining Cabinet led 
both party leaders to give their versions 
of events during the Budget debate. 
The two accounts differed in important 
respects. There is no doubt that the offer 
was made but the timing, probably just 
before the Budget debate, is uncertain; 
personal communication (anonymous).
Daily Hansard23. , 22 November, 2006. 
The Prime Minister’s estimate of likely 
abstentions was made in a conversation 
with me on 17 November, 2006.
Daily Hansard24. , 22 November, 2006 for 
Qarase’s speech and the vote on the 
second reading. The Budget passed its 
third reading on 23 November.
Daily Hansard25. , 8 August, 2006 for 
Chaudhry’s objection and the first reading 
of these Bills.
The clearest expression of Chaudhry’s 26. 
view that the multi-party Cabinet was 
being used by SDL to advance an 
ethno-nationalist agenda or to break 
FLP solidarity was his speech in the 
Budget debate; see Daily Hansard, 22 
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November, 2006. Some SDL members 
publicly advanced the notion that the 
FLP, in joining the Cabinet, had agreed 
to subordinate itself to the SDL; see the 
speech of M. Bulanauca, Daily Hansard, 
16 June, 2006.
Fijilive27. , 24 June, 2006.
Daily Hansard28. , 13 November, 2006.
Daily Hansard29. , 15 June 2006.
Hon. Simione Kaitani, “Parliamentary 30. 
Practice and the Multi-Party Government 
System in Fiji”, Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association, 28th Australian 
and Pacific Regional Conference, 
Wellington, August, 2006.
Daily Hansard31. , 11 September, 2006, 
for the report of the delegation. As New 
Zealand High Commissioner, I was the 
conduit for the New Zealand offer and had 
a number of discussions about the shape 
and timing of a visit, as well as other 
possible forms of assistance. Informally, 
Qarase and Chaudhry were keen to see 
a study tour go ahead.
Eleven of the Bills became law after 32. 
being passed by the Senate. Of the 
less contentious draft legislation, the 
Employment Relations Bill (No 8/06) 
had the greatest potential for partisan 
differences in the House that might have 
tested the multi-party arrangement. 
In fact, it went through reasonably 
expeditiously, although it was among the 
last Bills approved by the Senate. The 
reason for the smooth passage lay partly 
in its long gestation. A version of the Bill 
had been introduced in 1996, and there 
had been a great deal of consultation with 
stakeholders before Bill No. 8/06 was 
introduced into the House on 22 June, 
2006. 
Daily Hansard33. , 27 and 29 November, 
2006.
See, for example the speeches of 34. 
Udit Narayan (Minister of Primary and 
Preventative Health) and Chaitanya 
Lakshman (Minister for Local Government 
and Urban Development). Daily Hansard, 
20 November, 2006.
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